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Introduction This	paper	discusses	the	issue	of	electricity	access	as	a	key	development	challenge	in	the	Global	South.	The	development	of	energy	services	is	a	vital	component	of	 any	 social	 development	 policy	 strategy.	 Energy	services	 such	 as	 heating,	 cooling,	 cooking	 and	lighting	meet	 basic	 needs	 to	 sustain	 life,	 and	 fulfil	secondary	 socio-economic	 benefits	 such	 as	recreation,	 educational	 attainment,	 economic	productivity	and	poverty	alleviation.	Meeting	energy	service	 needs	 for	 the	 world’s	 poorest	 people	necessitates	 the	 use	 of	 different	 fuel	 sources	 and	technologies	under	varying	geographic,	political	and	socio-economic	 conditions.	 For	 many	 in	 the	developing	 world,	 energy	 services	 are	 met	 by	 the	burning	of	solid	carbon-based	fuels	such	as	charcoal,	wood,	 peat	 or	 lignite	 (commonly	 referred	 to	 as	brown	coal).	The	use	of	such	fuels	is	problematic	due	to	 the	 health	 and	 environmental	 costs	 of	 their	production	and	use.	Moving	away	from	black-carbon	intensive	 fuel	sources	 towards	cleaner	burning	gas	and	electric	sources	is	of	critical	importance.	As	such,	improving	electricity	access	 through	 the	expansion	of	electricity	transmission	and	distribution	systems	(so	 called	 electricity	 ‘grids’)	 and	 the	 connection	 of	commercial	and	residential	properties,	has	become	an	 energy	 policy	 priority	 –	 driven	 by	intergovernmental	 organisation	 and	 donor	programmes	 to	 improve	 (primarily	 rural)	electrification.	Although	the	expansion	of	electricity	infrastructure	across	urban,	rural	and	peri-urban	spaces	provides	opportunities	 for	 improving	 the	 wellbeing	 and	livelihoods	 of	 the	 world’s	 poorest	 people,	 this	process	 is	 not	 automatic.	 Electricity	 access	 is	commonly	measured	in	terms	of	the	total	number	of	grid-connected	 communities	 and/or	 households;	however,	the	focus	upon	the	technical	infrastructure	and	 the	 expansion	 of	 grid	 connection	 often	 belies	problems	experienced	by	households.	Issues	such	as	electricity	pricing,	 supply	 intermittency,	 poor	 grid-connection	reliability,	as	well	as	cultural	and	social	practices	of	energy	service	use	(such	as	preferences	for	 specific	 cooking	 fuels	 for	 example)	 create	 a	complex	interwoven	picture	of	energy	use,	demand	and	 supply.	 Moreover,	 expansion	 of	 grid	 and	electricity	 access	 is	 embedded	 in	 institutional	 and	policy	 contexts	 that	 favour	 certain	 outcomes,	geographies	 and	 social	 groups.	 Such	 problems	 of	unequal	 access	 are	 exacerbated	 by	 domestic	 and	regional	 disruption	 –	 i.e.	 civil	 unrest,	 political	contestation	 and	military	 conflict	 –	 and	 exogenous	factors	 such	 as	 extreme	 weather	 events	(exacerbated	 by	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change),	global	 financial	 crises,	 changes	 in	 diplomatic	relations,	 inward	 investment	 and	 potential	‘enclaving’	 [1,	 2].	 Electricity	 access	 is	 therefore	fundamentally	 an	 issue	 of	 energy	 justice	 [3]–	 one	
that	 is	 attendant	 to	 broader	 political,	 geographical	and	socio-cultural	factors.	This	Energy	Insight	paper	presents	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 electricity	 access	challenge.	The	first	part	outlines	the	difficulties	and	opportunities	 of	 expanding	 grid	 access	 to	 improve	electricity	 service	 provision	 to	 the	 poorest	 people	globally,	and	the	second	explores	the	complexity	of	the	 political	 and	 justice	 implications	 of	 electricity	access	provision,	with	reference	to	an	in-depth	case	of	Mozambique.		
Part 1 – The electricity access challenge Poverty	alleviation	for	the	lowest	income	developing	nations	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 multi-dimensional	problem	that	involves	simultaneous	progress	across	17	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs).	The	SDGs	cover	health,	 gender	equality,	 jobs	and	 livelihoods,	environmental	 protection,	 and	 institutional	governance.	 They	 are	 a	 comprehensive	 policy	 and	planning	 tool	 for	 setting	 a	 global	 agenda	 to	 end	poverty	 [4].	 However,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 clear	transnational	 political	 commitment	 to	 improving	development	 outcomes	 through	 the	mechanism	 of	the	 SDGs,	 despite	 significant	 progress	 in	 the	 last	decade,	 nearly	 800	 million	 people	 still	 live	 in	extreme	poverty	–	defined	as	those	earning	$1.90	per	day	or	less	[5].	The	global	challenge	of	multi-scalar	and	 multi-sectoral	 poverty	 alleviation	 involves	 a	complex	array	of	policy	and	economic	development	options.	At	the	core,	however,	is	a	need	to	improve	opportunities	 for	 the	 poorest	 people,	 primarily	 by	widening	access	to	public	services	(including	health	and	 education)	 and	 basic	 infrastructure	 such	 as	energy	 access	 [6],	 as	 well	 as	 their	 respective	capabilities	to	meet	their	own	needs	[7-9].		With	regards	to	energy,	SDG7	emphasizes	the	need	to	“ensure	access	to	affordable,	reliable	and	modern	energy	for	all	by	2030”	[4].	The	SDG#7	is	primarily	interpreted	by	national	policy	institutions	as	a	need	to	 directly	 improve	 electricity	 and	 fuel	 access.	Energy	 access	 is	 commonly	 posited	 as	 the	 mirror	opposite	of	energy	poverty	–	a	condition	of	unstable	and/or	unaffordable	access	 to	electricity	and	clean	fuels.	 SDG#7	 presents	 a	 challenge	 to	 policy	institutions,	 non-governmental,	 industry	 and	 third	sector	organisations.	Achieving	this	goal	requires	the	simultaneous	 development	 of	 both	 physical	resources	 (including	 technological	 infrastructures,	minerals	and	other	extractive	commodities,	research	and	innovation,	and	ecosystem	services)	and	social	infrastructures	 (including	 political	 institutions,	public	services,	cultural	assets,	capacity	building	and	nurturing	 local	 capabilities,	 and	 transparent	governance	 systems)	 [10,	 11],	 such	 that	 social	welfare	 is	 maximised	 through	 access	 to	 energy	services,	 and	 not	 just	 the	 private	 profit	 of	 energy	organisations.	 Social	 scientists	 commonly	 refer	 to	these	 inter-related	 sets	 of	 social	 and	 physical	
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components	 as	 ‘socio-technical’	 systems	 [12,	 13]	that	bring	together	a	web	of	inter-connected	human,	physical,	 material	 and	 technological	 elements.	Electricity	provision	and	access	are	key	examples	of	this	socio-technical	framing	[14-16]	–	the	provision	of	 the	 service	 is	 not	 solely	 explained	 by	 the	construction	 of	 the	 technical	 infrastructure,	 but	rather	 in-relation	 to	 the	 broader	 patterning	 of	energy	 services,	 contexts	 and	 cultures	 in	 which	energy	 connects	 with	 the	 social	 life	 of	 users.	Electricity	 access	 also	 underpins	 related	commitments	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 anthropogenic	climate	disruption	 from	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	and	so	the	socio-technical	system	of	energy	services	connects	 deeply	 with	 the	 broader	 ecological	 and	geophysical	 systems	 that	 support	 human	 and	non-human	life	and	wellbeing	on	a	global	scale.		Energy	 access	 as	 a	 policy	 priority	 involves	increasingly	 complex	 and	 interconnected	international	 agreements	 on	 sustainable	 energy	access	 and	 climate	 change.	 The	 global	 spotlight	 on	rural	 electrification	 and	 sustainable	 energy	transitions	is	mobilising	billions	of	dollars	in	finance	for	technology	transfer	to	the	Global	South,	either	to	increase	 generation	 capacity	 or	 to	 extend	 grid	infrastructures	 and	 domestic,	 or	 household	connections	[17,	18].	For	instance,	in	2013	investors	mobilised	US$13.1	billion	globally	in	energy	access,	with	 97%	 of	 that	 funding	 targeting	 electricity	networks	 [17].	 However,	 the	 deployment	 of	significant	 financial	 resources	 to	 advance	sustainable	energy	goals	has	often	reproduced	what	could	 be	 termed	 neoliberal	 policy	 prescriptions.	Public	sector	roles	in	energy	services	provision	are,	in	many	cases,	 limited	to	regulatory	functions	such	as	 creating	 an	 ‘enabling	 environment’	 for	 clean	energy	technologies	to	grow	[19].	This	represents	a	shift	 towards	 the	 development	 of	 the	 ‘regulatory	state’	 [20],	 characterised	 by	 processes	 of	privatisation	 and	 deregulation	 which	 replaced	 the	‘dirigiste	state’	of	the	past	(whereby	the	state	exerts	a	 strong	directive	 influence	 over	 investment)	 [21].	Thus	 regulation,	 rather	 than	 public	 ownership,	planning	or	centralised	administration,	have	become	the	 key	 contextual	 factors	 influencing	 how	 low	carbon	energy	transitions	have	come	to	be	governed	[22].	Despite	 the	 socio-technical	 nature	 of	 electricity	services,	 analysts	 commonly	 frame	 sustainable	energy	provision	as	a	matter	for	technical	experts	–	a	challenge	of	increasing	transmission	distances	and	maximising	the	number	of	consumer	connections	to	centralised	 grid	 infrastructures.	 With	 a	 strong	international	 focus	 on	 electricity	 grid	 extension,	much	 existing	 development	 research	 has	 focused	upon	 binary	 metrics,	 such	 as	 whether	 or	 not	 a	household	has	an	electricity	connection	[23].	Yet	the	energy	access	challenge	is	more	complex.	Clearly,	the	expansion	 of	 domestic	 connections	 does	 not	
automatically	 guarantee	 access	 to	 reliable	 and	sustainable	 electricity.	 Moreover,	 even	 where	 the	headline	metric	of	grid	access	is	increasing,	this	does	not	 necessarily	 help	 policymakers	 to	 understand	how	 expanding	 energy	 access	 relates	 with	 overall	socio-economic	development.		Electricity	access	 can	be	problematised	 in	multiple	ways.	 First,	 is	 that	 where	 electricity	 grid	 access	exists,	it	is	often	unreliable	(especially	in	remote	and	rural	 locations).	 In	 many	 developing	 states,	electricity	 access	 is	 commonly	 through	 irregular,	patchy	and	informal	(often	illegal)	connections	[24].	On	 a	 technical	 level,	 there	 are	 further	 factors	 to	consider,	such	as	–	 is	 the	connection	to	 the	central	grid	 or	 an	 independent	 ‘islanded’	 micro-grid?	 Are	connections	 safe	 and	 well	 maintained?	 Are	 grid	connections	 and	 electricity	 supply	 affordable?	 Is	access	dependent	on	one	or	more	energy	generation	technologies?	 Is	 there	 sufficient	 skills	 capacity	 for	repair	and	maintenance	of	electricity	services?	[25].	Second,	 for	electrification	programmes	 intended	 to	connect	 new	 users	 nationally,	 these	 often	 do	 not	significantly	contribute	either	 to	 the	 intensification	of	 electricity	 consumption	 nor	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	biomass	 (such	 as	 charcoal	 and	 fuelwood)	 use	 in	households.	This	 is	because	 the	domestic	 choice	of	energy	 source	 is	 dependent	 on	 factors	 such	 as	fluctuating	 and	 uncertain	 prices	 and	 on	 household	capability	 to	 invest	 in	 new	 energy-consuming	appliances.	 Conversely,	 however,	 biomass	 sources	and	kerosene	are	often	more	expensive	per	unit	of	useful	energy	than	higher-grade	sources,	suggesting	that	although	electrification	has	proved	challenging,	it	 should	 (normatively)	 remain	 a	 key	 poverty	alleviation	strategy	[26].	By	relegating	electricity	access	to	a	solely	technical	issue,	 the	 solution	 is	 often	 viewed	 at	 least	 by	mainstream	 observers	 and	 decision-makers,	 as	 a	process	reliant	on	achieving	economies	of	scale,	and	one	 that	 can	 be	 delivered	 and	 managed	 in	 a	depoliticised	 and	 socially-neutral	 manner	 [27].	Critical	 geographers	 and	 social	 scientists	 studying	energy,	however,	have	increasingly	come	to	question	this	view,	pointing	to	the	complexities	of	access	and	the	 socio-political	 dimensions	 of	 energy	 provision	and	 energy	 infrastructures	 as	 key	 sites	 of	contestation	 [28,	 29].	 On	 a	 simple	 level,	 electricity	access	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 three	“Rs”—	rural	electrification	(the	process),	reform	of	the	 electricity	 sector	 (the	 catalyst),	 and	 renewable	and	 other	 low	 carbon	 energy	 technologies	 (the	means)	[30].	Yet,	in	trying	to	improve	access,	across	the	world	 there	has	been	 significant	 growth	 in	 the	development	 of	 centrally	 planned	 electricity	transmission	 and	 distribution	 networks,	with	 little	attention	 paid	 by	 policy-makers,	 infrastructure	development	 bodies,	 and	 planners	 to	 the	 broader	social	impacts,	institutional	configurations	and	local-regional	 development	 goals	 that	 drive	 particular	
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socio-technical	 system	 changes.	 It	 is	 necessary	therefore,	to	structure	energy	transitions	and	socio-technical	system	changes	in	context-specific	ways	–	to	 incorporate	 ‘bottom-up’	 assessment	 of	 the	political,	 economic	 and	 social	 circumstances	 of	regional,	 national	 or	 sub-national	 energy	 systems	in	which	new	technologies	are	to	be	applied	[31].	Moreover,	quantifying	the	impacts	of	energy	access	gains	 (or	 conversely	 the	 lost	 opportunities)	 to	vulnerable	populations	 remains	highly	 challenging,	so	that	calculating	the	costs	and	benefits	of	different	electrification	 strategies	 remains	 difficult.	Furthermore,	many	of	 the	centralised	grid	systems	emerging	globally	rely	on	fossil	fuel-based	sources	of	electricity,	 such	 as	 thermal	 coal,	 oil	 or	 gas.	 Energy	networks	 are	 commonly	 subject	 to	 technological	‘obduracy’	 and	 ‘carbon	 lock-in’	 –	 or,	 how	 a	combination	of	political,	economic	and	technological	path	dependencies	resulting	from	colonial	histories,	poverty,	 resource	 availability	 and	 technological	capacity,	steer	energy	system	development	down	a	carbon	 intensive	 pathway,	 which	 becomes	increasingly	difficult	to	reverse	[32-34].		National	 governments	 are	 frequently	motivated	 to	expand	 centralised	 grid	 networks	 (either	 low-carbon	or	 carbon-intensive)	 because	domestic	 and	commercial	 energy	 consumption	 is	 a	 key	 tool	 for	economic	 growth	 of	 local	 and	 national	 economies.	Some	states	are	further	motivated	to	invest	in	large	energy-related	 infrastructures	 as	 a	 means	 forge	visible	 connections	 with	 citizens	 (and	 voters)	 in	their	 daily	 lives,	 at	 least	 at	 the	 level	 of	 political	rhetoric	[35,	36].	This	issue	of	the	political	framing	of	energy	 infrastructure	 is	 significant.	 Of	 note	 is	 the	problem	of	the	so-called	“securitisation	framing”	of	energy	access.	Securitisation	is	a	political	discourse	or	policy	frame	in	which	decision-makers	appeal	to	national-interest	concerns	of	public	safety	 in	order	to	reduce	individual	rights	and	freedoms,	and	press	forward	 with	 controversial	 policy	 measures	unimpeded	 by	 democratic	 scrutiny.	 The	 energy	security	dilemma	 is	 one	 form	of	 this	 securitisation	frame	 –	 the	 perceived	 need	 to	 build	 new	infrastructure	 to	 meet	 development	 needs	 means	that	 land-use	 changes	 for	 grid	 infrastructure,	renewable	 energy	 generation	 technologies	 and	others	(such	as	biomass,	or	new	fossil	fuel-powered	systems)	 are	 implemented	 without	 access	 to	information,	 opportunities	 for	 public	 scrutiny,	access	to	public	participation	in	decision-making	or	legal	 redress	 in	 the	 event	 of	 environmental	 justice	disputes.	 Securitisation	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	infrastructure	 expansion	 is	 a	 growing	 problem	across	both	high	and	 low-income	economies	under	conditions	 of	 rapid	 low-carbon	 transition	 [22,	 37,	38].		From	a	development	perspective,	we	are	faced	with	multiple,	 seemingly	 incommensurable	 problems.	
The	 first,	 is	 the	 mass	 expansion	 of	 universal	electrification	 (and	 supporting,	 yet	 often	 largely	invisible	infrastructures,	including	power	grid	lines	and	substations,	pipelines,	 converters	and	outlets).	The	 second,	 is	 the	 assurance	 of	 rights,	 justice,	environmental	 protections	 and	 democratic	accountability	 within	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 its	interaction	 with	 the	 wider	 political	 economy.	 The	third,	 is	avoidance	of	dangerous	climate	change	by	reducing	 the	 carbon	 footprint	 of	 multiple	 (and	overlapping)	 socio-technical	 energy	 systems.	Balancing	 these	 three	 policy	 priorities	 is	 an	enormous	 challenge	 for	 international	 governance	institutions,	 national	 and	 regional	 governments,	local	development	agencies	and	civil	society	groups.	This	Energy	Insight	aims	to	contribute	to	debates	on	sustainable	 energy	 access	 across	 this	 ‘trilemma’	 of	the	 political	 economy	of	 energy	 [39-41].	We	do	 so	through	 suggesting	 that	historical-institutional	 and	political-economic	perspectives	offer	a	set	of	tools	to	examine	 energy	 access	 and	 energy	 usage	 in	particular	places	and	contexts.	These	tools	foster	an	analysis	 of	 structural	 conditions	 [42]	while	 posing	questions	about	who	wins,	who	loses	and	why,	as	a	result	 of	 particular	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 socio-technical	 systems	 [43].	 As	 Castán	 Broto	 et	 al.	 [44]	observed,	 “Not	 all	 transitions	 are	 just,	 and	transitions	 themselves	 may	 generate	 further	inequalities.”	
The benefits of electrification Mass	 electrification	 and	 access	 to	 reliable	 energy	services	is	an	important	goal	for	social	and	economic	development	 and	 human	 wellbeing.	 As	 previously	mentioned,	 electricity	 provision	 has	 tremendous	social	 value,	 as	 well	 as	 offering	 secondary	improvements	 to	 health	 and	 local	 environmental	conditions	[11,	45,	46].	For	many	people	across	the	world,	 heating	 and	 lighting	 is	 provided	 by	 open	flames	–	such	as	wick	lamps	or	oil	lamps,	open	fires	and	 candles	 [47].	 These	 are	 very	 low-efficiency	heating	 and	 lighting	 sources.	 The	 greenhouse	 gas	emissions	associated	with	wood	fuel	and	kerosene-based	 systems	 is	 significant.	 There	 are	 also	considerable	health	 impacts	 from	 the	 inhalation	of	black	 carbon	 and	 particulates	 produced	 by	 open	flames.	 Providing	 electricity-based	 solutions	 to	heating,	 cooking	 and	 lighting	 therefore	 has	immediate	 health	 benefits	 from	 improved	 air	quality,	 reduced	 risk	 of	 uncontrolled	 fires	 and	associated	 injury	 and	 death,	 as	 well	 as	 potential	domestic	 cost	 savings,	 thus	 improving	 household	incomes.		Policies	 and	 industry	 strategies	 to	 improve	 energy	security	through	mass	electrification	in	urban,	peri-urban	and	rural	 locations	can	provide	a	number	of	substantive	 advantages.	 First,	 improvement	 of	electricity-based	 energy	 provision	 can	 raise	 living	
EEG	Energy	Insight		 November	2019	
©	Applied	Research	Programme	on	Energy	and	Economic	Growth	 5	
standards	 for	 the	 poorest	 people,	 in	 terms	 of	amenities	and	services.	For	example,	in	many	cases,	increasing	 access	 to	 electricity	 reduces	 household	expenditures	for	energy	services	(such	as	kerosene)	by	replacing	them	with	direct	access	[48,	49].	Other	energy	 services	 are	 of	 growing	 social	 significance.	Mobile	 phones	 are	 becoming	 an	 important	 part	 of	many	 local	 and	 regional	 development	 strategies.	Phones	are	often	presented	in	the	popular	media	as	non-essential	luxury	items,	however,	we	argue	that	they	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 basic	 needs	technologies	 across	 all	 levels	 of	 society.	 Access	 to	mobile	 phones	 improves	 educational	 outcomes,	mental	 health,	 political	 engagement	 and	 social	capital	 available	 to	 the	 poorest	 people	 [50-54].	Additionally,	 phone	 access	 provides	 better	integration	 of	 family	 networks	 and	 social	 support	(particularly	under	conditions	of	forced	or	seasonal	migration	 due	 to	 environmental	 stressors,	 civil	unrest	 or	 market	 changes),	 improved	communication	 with	 business	 services,	 supply	chains	 and	 financial	 organisations	 (including	participation	 in	 the	 marketplace	 through	 mobile	banking	and	money	transfer	using	smartphone	apps	and	telephone	banking).	Access	to	Internet	services	through	mobile	phone	data	also	improves	access	to	educational	 materials,	 practical	 information	 to	improve	 community	 adaptive	 capacity	 and	 the	strength	 of	 social	 networks.	 Mobile	 phones	 and	underlying	 electrical	 and	 terrestrial	telecommunications	 infrastructure	 reduce	communication	 costs	 and	 therefore	 allows	individuals	 and	 firms	 to	 send	 and	 to	 obtain	information	 quickly	 and	 cheaply	 on	 a	 variety	 of	economic,	social,	and	political	topics.	Reduced	cost	of	mediated	communication,	 in	turn,	 leads	to	tangible	economic	 benefits,	 improving	 agricultural	 and	labour	 market	 efficiency,	 producer	 and	 consumer	welfare,	alongside	with	wider	rural	connectivity	[55,	56].	However,	the	poorest	people,	particularly	those	who	 live	 off-grid	 usually	 in	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	communities,	spend	significant	amounts	of	time	and	personal	financial	resources	charging	mobile	phone	batteries;	electricity	access	would	ameliorate	 these	constraints.	 Given	 the	 (variable	 but	 generally	increasing)	 rate	 of	 uptake	 of	 mobile	 phone	technologies	 across	 the	 developing	world	 [57,	 58],	providing	 reliable	 electricity	 sources	 for	 this	purpose	 alone	would	 have	 beneficial	 development	outcomes.		Second,	 improvements	 in	 the	 availability	 of	electricity	services	increases	the	direct	and	indirect	employment	 opportunities	 for	 supply-side	 energy	services.	 These	 include	 electricity	 generation,	technology	installation,	distribution	and	sale	across	the	 energy	 delivery	 chain,	 and	 the	 economic	development	 effects	on	 the	demand	 side	 –	 such	as	improving	productivity	of	rural	 industries	(such	as	food	processing)	[30,	49].	As	mentioned	in	relation	to	 the	 twin	 commitments	 of	 improving	 electricity	
access	 and	 reducing	 global	 climate	 change	 risk,	numerous	 innovations	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 low-carbon	 energy	 innovation	 ‘space’.	 These	 include	micro-renewables,	 such	as	 stand-alone	 solar	water	heaters	 and	 solar	 photovoltaics	 (PV),	 wind	 power	and	 geothermal	 technologies,	 micro/mini-grids,	alongside	 innovations	 such	 as	 agrivoltaics,	 which	combine	solar	PV	suspended	above	growing	areas	to	provide	shade	 for	high-value	crops	 [59].	There	are	also	 innovations	 with	 aquavoltaic	 systems,	 or	 so-called	 “floatovoltaic”	 technology	 –	 water-deployed	solar	 photovoltaic	 systems	 combined	with	 farming	of	 aquatic	 organisms	 [60].	 Accordingly,	 there	 is	 a	rapid	 expansion	 of	 local	 markets	 for	 renewable	electricity	 generation,	 technology	 installation,	maintenance	and	consulting	[61,	62].		Given	these	dynamics,	enhancing	electricity	access	is	not	 solely	 a	 challenge	 for	 development	organisations,	 it	 also	 represents	 opportunities	 for	human-centred	 and	 bottom-up	 community	 energy	provision	 [63],	 entrepreneurial	activity,	new	 forms	of	 public-private	 partnerships,	 and	 models	 of	community	 ownership	 for	 energy	 generation	 [64,	65].	As	Alstone	et	al.	[66]	argue,	the	contemporary	electricity	technology	landscape	is	permeated	with	rapidly	 developing	 (and	 rapidly	 spreading)	decentralised	 network	 models	 and	 systems.	Community	 energy	 provision	 is	 primarily	 brought	about	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 decentralised	energy	 networks,	 which	 combine	 high-efficiency	consumer	 and	 end-use	 appliances	 and	 low-cost	renewable	 energy	 generation	 technologies	including	 (but	 not	 limited	 to)	 low-cost	photovoltaic	cells	[64,	65,	67].	As	Alston	et	al.	[66]	continue,	 the	 growth	 in	 decentralised	 systems	 to	improve	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	 electrification	 is	 a	type	 of	 technological	 evolution,	 facilitated	 by	 the	growth	 in	 information	 technology	 access,	specifically	 through	 mobile	 phone	 network	infrastructure	and	virtual	 financial	 services.	They	argue	 that	 decentralised	 electricity	 systems	 are	disruptive	 in	 that	 they	 rapidly	 increase	 access	 to	basic	electricity	services	to	improve	quality	of	life,	whilst	simultaneously	driving	action	towards	low-carbon	 development	 –	 effectively	 bypassing	 the	need	for	centralised	and	grid-connected	fossil	fuel-based	systems.	Third,	 a	 shift	 from	black-carbon	 based	 energy	 and	fuel	sources	(e.g.,	lignite	[brown	coal],	peat,	dung	or	domestic	 charcoal)	 towards	 domestic	 electricity-powered	lighting	and	gas	or	geothermal	heating	will	greatly	 reduce	 the	 health	 risks	 [68],	 such	 as	respiratory	 disorders,	 cancer	 and	 heart	 disease	associated	with	prolonged	exposure	to	black-carbon	fuels	[24,	68-71].	Moreover,	a	shift	from	centralised	fossil	 fuel-based	 electricity	 production	 from	 coal	(particularly	 lignite)	 will	 reduce	 the	 carbon	emissions	 per	 unit	 of	 energy	 and	 thus	 mitigate	climate	 change	 impacts	 from	 rapid	 economic	
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development	[72,	73].	It	will	also	reduce	the	health	risks	associated	with	ambient	air	pollution,	such	as	smog	and	ozone	pollution	 that	blights	many	of	 the	world’s	 most	 populous	 cities.	 There	 is	 a	 need	therefore	 for	 the	 simultaneous	mass	 electrification	and	 rapid	 transition	 towards	 low-carbon/low-particulate	 pollutant	 energy-generation	technologies.	Fourth,	reliance	upon	black-carbon	fuel	sources	for	heating	and	 lighting	 is	 associated	with	widespread	local	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 poor	environmental	health,	primarily	from	deforestation	for	fuelwood	and	charcoal.	An	estimated	2.7	billion	people	 globally	 rely	 upon	 wood-based	 fuels	 for	cooking	[74].	There	is	a	lack	of	reliable	baseline	data	on	global	charcoal	consumption,	and	as	such,	there	is	a	risk	that	over-generalisation	around	the	extent	to	which	 charcoal	 is	 causing	 forest	 damage	 is	preventing	 an	 effective	 policy	 response	 [75].	However,	 case	 studies	 in	 different	 developing	country	contexts	using	different	methods	(including	satellite	 image	 observational	 studies	 and	ethnographic	 studies)	 do	 show	 deforestation	occurring	 [76-78].	 Mass	 charcoal	 production	provides	opportunities	 for	 income-generation	 [79],	though	 it	 commonly	 damages	 biodiversity	 and	ecosystem	service	provision,	with	resultant	negative	impacts	 upon	 agricultural	 capacity	 and	 human	health	 and	wellbeing	 [80,	 81].	 Over	 80%	 of	 urban	households	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa	 employ	 charcoal	as	a	primary	cooking	fuel,	and	charcoal	also	provides	a	significant	source	of	income	for	rural	households	in	areas	with	access	to	peri-urban	and	urban	markets;	though	charcoal	use	is	of	course	not	limited	to	rural	communities	 [82-85].	As	Zulu	and	Richardson	 [86]	have	observed,	poorer	households	are	more	likely	to	participate	 in	 the	 production	 and	 sale	 of	 charcoal,	primarily	 to	 provide	 an	 economic	 safety	 net	 by	supplementing	 other	 sources	 of	 income.	 Policy	responses	 to	 reduce	 household	 dependence	 on	charcoal	must	therefore	not	only	replace	wood	fuels	in	 domestic	 settings	 but	 must	 also	 provide	 an	alternative	 income	 stream	 for	 farmers	 and	labourers.		Fifth,	 electrification	 has	 secondary	 social	 benefit	outcomes	 beyond	 the	 direct	 economic	 benefits	 to	households	 from	reduced	heating,	 lighting	and	fuel	costs,	 or	 the	 alterative	 income	generation	 streams.	For	example,	improved	heating	and	lighting,	reduced	time	gathering	wood	fuels,	and	reduced	time	spent	on	 seeking	 mobile	 phone	 charging,	 will	 improve	opportunities	(particularly	for	women	and	girls)	to	engage	in	recreation	and	education,	thus	improving	wellbeing,	health	and	social	outcomes	[87].	Studies	of	 rural	 electrification	 find	 that	 the	 greater	 the	likelihood	of	a	household’s	access	to	an	electric	grid,	the	more	time	the	household’s	children	are	likely	to	spend	studying	at	home,	offering	indirect	evidence	of	an	improvement	in	levels	of	schooling	[88,	89].	Other	
researchers	have	shown	electrification	to	accelerate	opportunities	 for	 women.	 Domestic	 electricity	access	 helps	 to	 move	 women	 and	 girls	 into	 more	economically	 productive	 activities,	 and	 Samad	 and	Zhang	 [90]	 find	 that	 electrification	 measurably	improves	 women's	 decision-making	 ability,	mobility,	financial	autonomy,	reproductive	freedom,	and	social	participation.	Overall,	 the	 analyses	 discussed	 here	 have	implications	 for	 the	 ability	 of	 lower-income	developing	 economies	 to	 promote	 and	 sustain	increases	 in	 energy	 access,	 along	 with	 a	 range	 of	associated	benefits	to	this	process.	Given	the	extent	of	the	energy	access	challenge,	with	an	estimated	1.1	billion	people	currently	lacking	access	to	electricity	[16],	several	authors	argue	for	developmentalist	and	publicly-funded	 interventions,	 alongside	 nurturing	opportunities	 for	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurial	approaches	[19].	Yet,	 the	picture	remains	complex;	and	apart	from	highlighting	these	direct	and	indirect	benefits	reached	through	increasing	and	improving	energy	 access,	 geographers,	 STS	 (science	 and	technology	studies)	scholars,	and	other	critical	social	scientists	have	developed	new	 lines	of	 research	on	energy	access	in	the	global	South.	Such	research	has	focused	 heavily	 upon	 energy	 poverty,	 justice	 and	people’s	everyday	lived	experiences	[44],	low	carbon	energy	 transitions,	 along	 with	 social	 and	 cultural	aspects	 of	 new	 lighting	 and	 cooking	 technologies	[91].		Related	 to	 the	 emerging	 debates	 in	 which	 the	concept	 of	 ‘energy	 justice’	 figures	 prominently,	Castán	 Broto	 [63]	 and	 Castán	 Broto	 et	 al.	 [44,	 92]	have	 recently	 explored	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘energy	sovereignty’	 over	 energy	 generation,	 transmission	and	 distribution	 systems.	 In	 a	 developing	 and	postcolonial	 context,	 this	 means	 learning	 to	recognise	 how	 people	 themselves	 engage	with	 the	making	 of	 technologies	 of	 everyday	 life	 through	hybrid	 forms	of	 contextually	generated	 innovation.	Another	stream	of	literature	highlights	the	local	and	global	 infrastructures	 of	 production,	 transport	 and	distribution	 of	 energy,	 along	 with	 practices	 of	securing	 such	 activities	 and	 their	 spatial	manifestations	 [93].	 Such	 spatial	 justice	 issues	concern	 problems	 of	 land-grabbing,	 displacement	and	 social	 oppression	 linked	 to	 large-scale	 energy	investments	[2,	94].	This	analysis	seeks	to	uncover	emerging	spatial	dimensions	of	power	and	politics,	adding	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 state-building	 and	geopolitical	 relations,	 particularly	 in	 postcolonial	contexts.		In	the	second	part	of	this	paper,	we	narrow	the	focus	of	 electricity	 access	 within	 a	 geographically-bounded	 case	 study.	 Specifically,	we	 explore	 these	issues	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Sub-Saharan	 electricity	access	 and	 development.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	discussion	 of	 a	 critical	 case	 of	 electricity	 access	 in	
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Mozambique:	 one	 of	 the	 Southern	 African	 region’s	largest	 hydropower-generating	 yet	 energy	 access-poor,	countries.	We	outline	and	analyse	some	of	the	challenges	involved	in	extending	energy	access	in	an	equitable	and	sustainable	manner,	and	 then	reflect	upon	the	Mozambican	case	for	broader	energy-and-development	policy	and	planning.	
Part 2 – The political economy of electricity 
access: the case of Mozambique 
Electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa Although	 the	 benefits	 of	 electrification	 for	 global	social	and	economic	development	are	clear	[95-97]	in	many	states,	notably	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	most	investments	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 fail	 to	 meet	 the	energy	 needs	 of	 the	 poorest	 people,	 even	 in	countries	 where	 access	 to	 grid-connected	 energy	services,	unplanned	service	disruptions	and	power	outages	 are	 commonly	 experienced.	 Moreover,	supply	 of	 electricity	 is	 not	 always	 affordable,	 and	many	 rural,	 off-grid	 and	 micro-grid	 systems	 only	have	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	 provide	 a	 few	 hours	 of	electricity	services	per	day.	Consequently,	even	 for	many	 of	 those	 who	 have	 gained	 access	 through	 a	permanent	 grid	 connection,	 the	 absolute	 level	 of	electricity	 consumption,	 and	 access	 to	 electricity	services	 is	 low,	 and	 as	 the	 International	 Energy	Agency	 argue,	 there	 is	 no	 universally	 accepted	minimum	threshold	for	what	constitutes	electricity	access,	particularly	in	establishing	policy	targets	[18,	98,	99].		Fully	two-thirds	of	total	energy	investment	in	Africa	is	 dedicated	 to	 producing	 energy	 for	 export	 while	roughly	 half	 of	 current	 electricity	 consumption	 is	used	 for	 industry	 –	 primarily	mining	 and	 refining,	according	 the	 most	 recent	 Africa	 Energy	 Outlook	[98].	 Moreover,	 the	 needs	 and	 priorities	 of	 users,	particularly	 those	 of	 the	 poor,	 have	 been	 widely	overlooked	in	national	energy	planning,	as	the	focus	has	largely	been	on	locating	strategic	resources	for	global	 markets	 rather	 than	 providing	 energy	services	 tailored	 to	 local	 needs	 and	 conditions,	 or	offering	a	meaningful	voice	 to	users	 [17,	100].	 It	 is	necessary,	 therefore,	 to	 better	 understand	 and	engage	with	the	interests,	power	relations	and	policy	networks	 that	 shape	 the	 prospects	 of	 realising	climate	and	energy	policy	goals;	acting	as	barriers	in	some	 cases	 and	 as	 vehicles	 for	 change	 in	 others	[101].		Challenges	around	energy	infrastructure	and	supply	in	the	global	South	are	often	approached	from	what	could	be	called	a	“top-down	perspective,”	such	that	concerns	 with	 energy	 security	 and	 sovereignty	compete	with	 the	 demands	 of	 export	markets	 and	the	need	to	facilitate	global	trade	and	resource	flows.	
Such	 national-economy	 scale	 concerns	 often	 take	precedence	 over	 household	 and	 community	perspectives	on	energy	access	and	use.	This	presents	a	 serious	 challenge	 if	 ambitious	 targets	 to	 achieve	50%	 -	 100%	 access	 to	modern	 energy	 services	 by	2030	 in	 Africa	 are	 to	 be	 achieved.	 Electricity	infrastructure	planning,	construction,	operation	and	maintenance	 remain	 technically	 challenging	within	countries	 that	 have	 geographically	 isolated	 and	politically	fractured	regions	[102].	The	expansion	of	centralised	electricity	infrastructure	is	then	coupled	with	complex	long-term	governance	challenges,	not	least	the	effective	mobilisation	of	funding	from	both	internal	 sources	 (e.g.	 taxation-based	 public	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy,	 public-private	partnerships)	 and	 external	 sources	 (donors,	 loans,	inward	 investment	 and	 venture	 capital)	 funding	[103].	 Furthermore,	 the	 management	 of	 complex	financing	 programmes	 for	 energy	 system	investment	requires	greater	emphasis	both	upon	the	productive	 uses	 of	 energy,	 and	 upon	 effective	processes	of	institutional	governance	to	ensure	that	the	 vicious	 circle	 is	 broken	 between	 low	 incomes	leading	 to	 poor	 access	 to	modern	 energy	 services,	which	 in	 turn	 places	 limitations	 on	 the	 ability	 to	generate	 higher	 incomes.	 Breaking	 this	 cycle	requires	new	thinking	both	in	terms	of	the	types	of	electricity	technologies	and	resources	deployed,	and	in	 terms	 of	 the	 range	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	management	 of	 such	 complex	 socio-technical	systems	[42,	96,	97].		While	 the	 diversification	 of	 energy	 resources,	policies,	 investment	 models	 and	 governance	practices	 would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 rapid	 socially	sustainable	energy	transitions,	the	current	dominant	economic	model	across	much	of	sub-Saharan	Africa	focuses	 on	 large-scale	 energy	 consumers	 whose	activities	are	geared	towards	the	growth	of	top-level	economic	indicators,	such	as	GDP,	in	continuity	with	the	 colonial	 era.	 Conversely,	 a	 broad	 range	 of	domestic	and	rural	electricity	benefits	are	construed	as	‘social	welfare’	or	‘uneconomic’	policy	objectives	[104].	In	20th	Century	Europe,	electricity	access	was	achieved	 through	 centralised	 power	 generation	systems	 (usually	 situated	 in	 fossil	 fuel	 heartlands	located	 close	 to	 industrial	 cities),	 and	 mass	electricity	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 systems	branching	outwards	from	industrial	centres	to	rural	locations	 [105-107].	 The	 centralised	 electrification	model	of	20th	Century	European	rural	development	is	 increasingly	 challenged	 by	 decentralised	 and	alternative	 energy	 transitions,	 incorporating	 new	energy	generation	forms	(including	on-	and	offshore	wind,	hydro,	solar	and	limited	nuclear	and	biomass),	and	investment	models	including	micro-renewables	and	 community	 energy	 schemes	 [108-110].	 Thus,	the	normative	ideal	of	centralised	power	generation	in	Europe	is	now	shifting	towards	one	to	dispersed	and	 decentralised	 socio-technical	 energy	 systems	[66,	 111,	 112].	 However	 the	 rural	 electrification	
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model	 still	 remains	 influential	 across	 the	 African	continent,	 where	 mega-projects	 and	 centralised	power	systems	are	still	heavily	promoted	[35].	The	development	of	specific	infrastructure	models	under	certain	 governance	 arrangements	 is	 thus	mutually	reinforcing	 –	 political	 governance	 models	 that	involve	 state	 owned/controlled	 infrastructure	 and	energy	resources	will	tend	towards	the	construction	of	centralised	systems	of	energy	production,	which	in	 turn	 creates	 a	 system	 of	 centralised	 political	authority	 through	 the	 control	 of	 access	 to	 energy	services	[102,	113].		
The case of Mozambique Mozambique’s	political	and	social	history	 is	deeply	shaped	 by	 its	 colonial	 past.	 Mozambique	 lived	 for	four	 centuries	 under	 Portuguese	 colonial	 rule,	 and	the	 violent	 effects	 of	 colonial	 action	 remain	significant	–	with	the	oppression	of	 the	slave	trade	and	 brutal	 civil	 political	 repression	 by	 Portuguese	authorities	 remaining	 salient	 in	 Mozambican	memories	[114].	Mozambique’s	energy	system,	in	its	current	 form,	 is	 also	 shaped	 by	 this	 political	 and	economic	history.	During	 the	 colonial	 period,	 deep	divisions	between	the	northern,	the	central	Zambesi	
Figure 1 Figure 1 Map of Mozambique's electricity grid system.	Source:	https://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/national_energy_grid/mozambique/mozambiquenationalelectricitygrid.shtml	
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valley,	 and	 the	 southern	 regions	 emerged.	 Under	Portuguese	rule	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	the	 territory	 that	was	 to	become	Mozambique	was	divided	into	separate	concession	areas	and	governed	by	charter	companies,	often	British,	until	1942	[115].	This	is	significant	because	geographical	constraints	to	an	integrated	national	development	strategy	also	stem	from	the	location	of	the	capital	in	the	far	south,	physically	distant	from	the	rest	of	the	country.	The	development	 of	 infrastructure	 networks	 (e.g.	railway	 corridors,	 roads	 and	 later	 power	transmission	 lines),	 which	 linked	 regions	 of	 the	country	 to	 their	 inland	 neighbours	 (South	 Africa,	Zimbabwe,	Malawi)	 rather	 than	 to	 interior	 regions	[115,	116]	followed	this	pattern.		The	political	fragmentation	of	the	colonial	territory	was	also	reflected	in	the	electricity	network,	which	developed	 as	 three	 distinct	 systems:	 one	 in	 the	south,	 around	 Lourenço	 Marques	 (the	 colonial	designation	 of	 Maputo);	 another	 system	 in	 the	centre,	associated	with	the	city	of	Beira;	and	a	third	system	 consisting	 of	 dispersed	 urban	 centres,	 but	largely	 disconnected	 from	 each	 other	 [117]	 (see	Figure	1).	The	coastal	city	of	Beira	is	connected	to	the	central	 grid,	 which	 extends	 through	 the	 central	region	to	Zimbabwe,	and	draws	on	the	Chicamba	and	Mavuzi	dams	built	in	1950	and	1960,	respectively,	as	opposed	to	Cahora	Bassa,	which	supplies	the	south	and	far	north.		After	 Portugal’s	 Carnation	 Revolution	 of	 1974	 and	the	decolonisation	 of	 its	African	overseas	 colonies,	the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 Mozambique	 formed	 in	1975,	 though	after	 two	years	of	 independence,	 the	country	descended	into	a	protracted	civil	war	lasting	from	 1977	 to	 1992.	 During	 the	 conflict,	 the	FRELIMO-led	 (Frente	 de	 Libertação	 de	Moçambique)	 government	 sought	 to	 use	 energy	infrastructures	 as	 part	 of	 the	 larger	 project	 of	national	unity	and	modernisation.	The	Cahora	Bassa	hydroelectric	dam	was	to	play	a	key	role,	but	it	would	also	 require	 the	 integration	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	very	 limited	 colonial-era	 electric	 grid.	 To	 this	 end,	the	 government	 created	 a	 state-owned	 electricity	utility,	Electricidade	de	Moçambique,	E.P.	(EDM)	in	1977,	 integrating	 some	 two-dozen	 dispersed	colonial	production	and	distribution	units	[117].	The	government	provided	EDM	with	a	‘social	mandate’	to	support	national	social	and	economic	development,	but	this	was	curtailed	until	the	end	of	the	civil	war	in	1992.	 From	 1995,	 the	 post-war	 democratic	restructuring	 of	 Mozambique	 saw	 the	implementation	 of	 multi-party	 presidential	 and	parliamentary	 elections	 –	 a	 process	 of	democratisation	 that	 nonetheless	 has	 created	 a	divide	in	civil	authority	between	the	ruling	FRELIMO	party,	 and	 the	 opposition	 party	 RENAMO	 across	multiple	 political	 scales	 –	 affecting	 both	 national	policy	 and	 local	 frameworks	 of	 governance	 [118].	The	post-war	period	also	saw	the	rebuilding	of	civil	
infrastructure.	 As	 such,	 EDM	 began	 to	 expand	 the	domestic	 grid,	 with	 support	 from	 the	 donor	community,	 regional	 partners	 and	 foreign	investment	(ibid).	Since	then,	the	grid	has	expanded	substantially,	 connecting	 all	 provincial	 centres	 and	all	128	districts	(as	of	2014)	[119].	However,	several	important	limitations	remain.	The	existing	network	bypasses	 extensive	 rural	 areas,	 where	 the	 low	density	and	low-income	population	makes	it	difficult	and	costly	to	connect	people	to	the	grid.	The	central	and	northern	provinces	depend	largely	on	a	single,	ageing	transmission	line	each,	such	that	a	single	line	failure	 is	 enough	 to	 cut	 electricity	 to	 a	 vast	 area	[120].	 The	 low	 rate	 of	 electricity	 access	 remains	 a	key	 challenge	 for	 the	 country’s	 economic	development	and	social	wellbeing.	Currently,	Mozambique	has	one	of	the	lowest	rates	of	electricity	access	in	the	world,	with	roughly	one-quarter	of	its	28.8	million	inhabitants	having	access	to	electricity	 in	2018	[121].	 It	 is	an	 important	case	study	because,	similar	to	a	number	of	African	states,	it	enjoys	abundant	natural	energy	resources	(natural	gas,	coal	and	hydropower,	wind	and	solar	potential)	but	 continues	 to	 face	 entrenched	 energy	 poverty.	Furthermore,	the	country	has	experienced	a	regime	change	from	socialism	to	capitalism,	followed	by	the	privatisation	 of	 much	 of	 the	means	 of	 production,	along	 with	 protracted	 job	 scarcity	 and	 new	 socio-economic	dynamics	and	challenges	[115].	Concerns	were	 raised	 in	 the	 post-war	 redevelopment	 and	privatisation	 of	 state-owned	 firms	 and	 assets	 that	such	 privatisation	 was	 tantamount	 to	 re-colonisation	[122].	Energy	access	underpins	many	of	these	 challenges,	 including	 rapid	 urban	 growth,	gender	 and	 spatial	 inequality,	 and	 long-term	environmental	 degradation.	 The	Mozambican	 state	has	made	 electrification—both	urban	 and	 rural—a	major	 component	 of	 its	 development	 programs	[123].	 Despite	 the	 Mozambican	 government’s	modernising	 aspirations	 from	 the	 post-independence	 period	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	multiparty	 democracy	 in	 the	 1990s,	 through	 to	recent	efforts	to	attract	global	investors	in	the	2000s,	a	uniform	energy	provision	infrastructure	has	failed	to	 emerge.	 Policymakers	 and	 agencies	 have	struggled	 to	 coordinate	 interventions	 around	domestic	cooking,	electrification	and	mechanisation	needs	 in	 agriculture	 into	 long-term,	 integrated	energy	planning	model.		The	country’s	electricity	connection	metrics	include	20.17%	 of	 the	 population	 being	 grid-connected,	where	 access	 in	 rural	 areas	 remains	 low	 at	 5.7%,	whilst	urban	areas	continue	to	grow	[121].	Besides	the	wide	variance	across	the	rural-urban	continuum,	electricity	access	rates	also	vary	greatly	by	province	and	 city.	 For	 instance:	 95%	 of	 households	 have	access	 to	 electricity	 in	 Maputo	 City,	 the	 capital	 of	Mozambique,	 but	 this	 figure	 is	 66%	 in	 Beira,	historically	Mozambique’s	second	largest	city	[117].	
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EDM	[121]	attributes	the	low	figures	and	divergence	in	 access	 to	 electricity	 to	 the	 uneven	 distribution	network,	 along	with	 the	 historical	 exclusion	 of	 the	private	sector	from	investing	in	electricity	projects,	and	 low	 tariffs	 that	 are	 insufficient	 to	 fund	 new	expenditure	 without	 subsidies,	 while	 remaining	beyond	 reach	 for	 many	 Mozambican	 households,	particularly	 the	 poorest.	 Nonetheless,	 the	electrification	 rate	 has	 significantly	 increased	 over	the	past	two	decades,	growing	from	5%	in	2001	to	27%	 in	 2017,	which	 has	 renewed	 optimism	 about	the	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 50%	 by	 2023	 and	delivering	 universal	 energy	 nationally	 by	 2030	[121].		The	 Mozambican	 government	 has	 endorsed	 the	Sustainable	Energy	for	All	(SE4All)	targets	by	2030	and	 the	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals	 (SDGs).	 It	intends	to	achieve	the	SDG#7	through	two	strategies	based	on	the	characterisation	of	areas	as	either	rural	or	 urban,	 which	 has	 shaped	 the	 approaches	 for	energy	access	adopted	by	state	agencies	and	donors.	First,	there	is	a	strategy	of	grid	expansion	in	which	the	state-owned	utility,	EDM,	extends	 transmission	infrastructure	to	meet	growing	demand,	particularly	in	 cities	 and	 areas	 well-linked	 to	 commercial	networks.	 Second	 is	 a	 strategy	 of	 decentralised	generation,	operating	off	the	main	grid,	and	shaped	by	a	recognition	of	the	limits	of	grid	extension	and	by	donor	 priorities	 for	 addressing	 clean	 energy	 and	climate	agendas.	The	latter	is	implemented	by	Fundo	the	Energia	(FUNAE),	a	public	institution	established	in	1997	with	Danish	assistance,	to	promote	access	to	low-cost,	 sustainable	 and	 alternative	 sources	 of	electricity	in	areas	not	served	by	the	grid	[121].		FUNAE	 promotes	 access	 to	 electricity	 through	funding	 and	 implementing	 off-grid	 power	production	 systems,	 specifically	 solar	 PV	 stand-alone	systems	and	mini-grids,	mini-hydropower	and	biomass	[124].	However,	less	than	1%	of	households	have	benefited	from	off-grid	connections,	as	FUNAE	has	mostly	focused	on	electrifying	schools,	hospitals,	administrative	 offices	 and	 pumping	 stations	 with	solar	 panels	 [125].	 What	 is	 more,	 many	 of	 the	household	connections	have	failed,	due	to	operation	and	 management	 issues	 [126].	 Thus,	 there	 are	difficulties	in	connecting	through	off-grid	systems	a	considerable	 percentage	 of	 the	 5.9	 million	households	 needed	 to	 achieve	 universal	 access	 to	electricity	 networks	 [125].	 Compounding	 these	challenges,	 urban	 population	 growth	 has	outstripped	the	pace	at	which	households	have	been	connected	 to	 the	grid	 [96,	127].	Moreover,	 in	early	2019,	 two	 major	 cyclones	 –	 Idai	 and	 Kenneth	 –caused	significant	damage	to	energy	and	other	basic	infrastructure	 in	 Mozambique’s	 central	 and	northern	 regions,	 the	 cost	 and	 governance	challenges	 of	 rebuilding	 a	 resilient	 electricity	network	 system	 in	 the	 affected	 areas	 require	ongoing	financial	support	and	political	scrutiny.		
Some	 analysts	 emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 create	 the	conditions	 for	private	sector	participation	 to	scale-up	 and	 accelerate	 the	 pace	 of	 off-grid	 connections	[123,	126]	in	order	to	achieve	electrification	targets	whilst	 simultaneously	 reducing	 the	 burden	 of	infrastructure	 provision	 on	 public	 finances	 [126].	Fael	 [128]	 has	 suggested	 that	 private	 sector	participation	will	require	the	creation	of	a	regulating	entity	to	control	and	inspect	the	tariffs	applied	by	all	operators	 to	 avoid	 oligopolistic/cartel	 practices.	Infrastructures	 such	 as	 electricity	 networks	 are	commonly	subject	to	natural	monopolism	following	privatisation,	due	to	the	high	costs	and	lead	times	for	construction,	making	it	difficult	for	‘new	players’	to	enter	 electricity	 supply	 markets	 without	 public	finance	 assistance	 and	 governmental	 policy	 and	planning	support	[129].	Strong	regulatory	practices		are	 necessary	 to	 protect	 consumers’	 rights	 and	interests	 regarding	 tariffs	 and	 network	 costs,	 the	type	 and	 quality	 of	 service	 provided,	 including	complains	 related	 to	 damage	 to	 their	 household	electrical	appliances	due	to	power	overload	after	a	blackout	or	brownout.		Access	 to	 grid-connected	 electricity	 remains	aspirational	to	many	households	in	Mozambique.	As	such,	 promises	 of	 electricity	 provision	 are	 often	mobilised	as	a	tool	for	political	campaigns	to	attract	voters,	 including	 in	 the	 recent	 national,	 provincial	and	local	elections	of	October	2019.	Yet,	the	majority	of	 Mozambicans	 continue	 to	 rely	 on	 charcoal	 and	biomass	 to	 meet	 their	 energy	 needs.	 In	 urban	centres,	 charcoal	 is	 the	 major	 energy	 source	 for	cooking,	whilst	fuelwood	remains	the	primary	fuel	in	rural	areas	[117,	130].	Growing	demand	for	both	fuel	types	 drives	 high	 wood	 extraction	 rates	 over	increasing	areas	of	 forest	 [130].	CO2	emissions	per	capita	remain	comparatively	low	amongst	Southern	African	 states,	 at	 an	 estimated	 0.2	metric	 tons	 per	capita	(2016)	growing	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	5.52	 %	 [131].	 However,	 	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 low	carbon	 economy	 is	 gaining	 policy	 and	 public	attention	 in	 Mozambique.	 By	 most	 accounts,	Mozambique’s	 energy	 system	 is	 in	 transition:	renewables	 are	 shifting	 the	 expectations	 of	 energy	access,	particularly	in	rural	areas	[132].	As	growing	deforestation	 pushes	 the	 supply	 of	 charcoal	 and	fuelwood	further	from	major	cities,	raising	costs	and	secondary	 environmental	 impacts,	 there	 are	growing	 calls	 to	 use	 domestic	 fossil	 fuel	 resources	(including	 the	 newly-discovered	 natural	 gas	deposits	 in	 the	 northern	 Rovuma	 basin,	 on	 the	border	with	Tanzania)	for	the	social	benefit	or	public	good	 of	 citizens	 [133].	 The	 ambivalence	 and	contradictory	 implications	 of	 an	 emerging	 energy	transition	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 fully	 addressed,	 including	long-term	environmental	degradation	from	a	fossil-fuel-based	transition	pathway. 
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Mozambique’s colonial history influences 
its evolving energy system Mozambique’s	 electricity	 generation	 is	 heavily	dependent	upon	hydropower.	Hydroelectricity	is	the	primary	energy	source,	accounting	for	about	77%	of	all	electricity	generated	[120].	Alongside	production	from	other	smaller	dams,	with	a	combined	capacity	of	565	MW	[127],	the	Cahora	Bassa	dam	(2,075	MW)	sits	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 national	 energy	 system,	supplying	25%	of	electricity	 supplied	by	EDM.	The	bulk	 of	 the	 electricity	 load	 (1500	 MW)	 is	 then	exported	 to	 South	Africa	under	 a	 long-term	Power	Purchase	Agreement	(PPA)	between	Hidroeléctrica	de	Cahora	Bassa	(HCB)	and	South	Africa’s	electricity	utility	 (Eskom),	 in	 force	 through	 2029	 [121].	Mozambique	 has	 registered	 a	 deficit,	 however,	between	demand	and	supply	as	the	PPA	restricts	its	capacity	to	increase	the	supply	to	attend	the	growing	national	 and	 regional	 demand	of	 electricity	 access.	This	has	required	EDM	to	purchase	electricity	from	other	 energy	 sources	 that	 have	 emerged	 since	 the	early	 2000s.	 These	 include	 gas-fired	 power	 plants	run	by	private	firms,	known	as	Independent	Power	Producers	(IPPs).	The	tariffs	from	these	new	plants	are	higher	than	for	HCB-supplied	power,	while	they	exceed	 the	 amount	 that	 can	 be	 recovered	 from	current	electricity	tariffs	[119].	This	use	of	IPPs	has	exacerbated	 EDM’s	 finances	 and	 constrained	 its	ability	 to	 raise	 funds	 for	 grid	 extension	 and	maintenance.	From	 a	 governance	 perspective,	 the	 Mozambican	government	has	recently	approved	a	new	mandate	for	 the	 energy	 regulatory	 authority,	 ARENE,	 to	operate	from	2018,	with	enlarged	powers	over	tariff	setting,	concession	granting	and	compliance	controls	[125].	 The	 government’s	 announcement	notes	 that	ARENE’s	 main	 activity	 is	 to	 regulate	 electricity	subsectors,	 including	 those	 resulting	 from	 any	source	 of	 RETs,	 liquid	 fuels,	 biofuels,	 and	 the	distribution	 and	 commercialisation	 of	 natural	 gas.	Accordingly,	ARENE	could	potentially	play	a	role	in	bridging	previously	separate	grid-connected	and	off-grid	approaches,	along	with	fostering	links	between	electrification	 and	 fuel	 provision	 in	 multiple	contexts.	 Shifts	 in	Mozambique’s	political	 economy	of	energy	have	been	ongoing	since	the	early	2000s,	when	the	government	opened	its	economy	to	large-scale	 foreign	 investments,	 especially	 in	 extractive	resources.	 In	 harnessing	 investment	 in	 these	resources,	 including	 coal	 and	 offshore	 gas,	 the	government	 aims	 to	 reduce	 long-term	 aid	dependence	 while	 developing	 untapped	 markets	[134,	135].	Yet,	these	developments	risk	entrenching	carbon-intensive	resources	in	Mozambique’s	energy	mix.		Notwithstanding	 these	 trends,	 two	 major	 policy	initiatives	 towards	 electrification	 include	 the	Government	of	Mozambique’s	(GoM)	regulatory	and	
structural	reform	of	its	electricity	sector	to	improve	poverty	alleviation,	known	as	the	Energy	Reform	and	Access	 Programme	 (ERAP).	 The	 second	 is	 the	Roadmap	 for	 a	 Green	 Economy	 (GER)	 since	 2012,	primarily	 aimed	 at	 rational	 natural	 resource	utilisation	 (particularly	 energy)	 to	 preserve	ecosystems	 for	 meeting	 The	 Sustainable	Development	 Goals.	 The	 Mozambican	 state	leveraged	 funding	 and	 support	 from	 the	 African	Development	Bank	to	generate	what	it	describes	as	a	“high-level”	 policy	 strategy.	 The	 roadmap	establishes	 a	 series	 of	 ambitious	 development	targets,	 namely,	 to	 become	 an	 inclusive	 middle-income	 country	 by	 2030,	 whilst	 simultaneously	increasing	 ecosystem	 service	 protections.	 The	GER	policy	led	to	the	Green	Economy	Action	Plan	(GEAP),	which	the	Council	of	Ministers	approved	in	October	2013.	 GEAP	 was	 lauded	 as	 an	 inclusive	 and	pluralistic	model	of	policy	development	–	including	the	 participation	 of	 multiple	 governmental	institutions,	alongside	regional	and	local	authorities,	civil	 society	 and	 private	 sector	 stakeholders,	 and	operating	in	concert	with	regional-to-national	scale	public	 consultation.	 Thus	 there	 is	 considerable	evidence	of	a	participatory-deliberative	 ‘turn’	[136,	137]	 in	 energy	 policy	 –	whereby	 the	 legitimacy	 of	policy	outcomes	is	derived	from	the	opportunity	of	affected	 stakeholders,	 including	 so-called	 ‘lay	publics’,	 to	 have	 direct	 input	 into	 the	 decision-making	process.		The	 GEAP	 intended	 to	 shape	 the	 government’s	 5-year	plan	and	to	provide	the	basis	for	greening	the	National	 Development	 Strategy	 currently	 under	development.	 The	 plan	 is	 based	 on	 three	 pillars:	sustainable	 infrastructure,	efficient	and	sustainable	use	 of	 natural	 resources	 and	 strengthening	resilience	and	adaptability.	These	pillars	include	15	sub-sectors	and	a	 total	of	119	green	growth	policy	options	were	identified	through	the	technical	review	and	the	consultative	process	by	the	GoM.	The	aim	of	the	 former	 programme	 has	 been	 to	 increase	efficiency	of	 the	electricity	distribution	services,	 as	well	as	expand	access	mainly	in	the	urban	and	peri-urban	areas	[138].		Although	 both	 policies	 focus	 on	 energy	 system	development	 as	 economic	 growth	 and	 policy	alleviation	measures,	reviews	of	government	policy	programmes	show	slow	progress	on	the	ground.	In	Mozambique,	electricity	access	has	been	challenged	by	 complicated	 governance	 factors.	 External	evaluation	of	energy	governance	institutions	deems	them		to	be	operationally	inefficient	and	plagued	by	poor	 institutional	 reform	 [138-140].	 As	 such,	 The	World	 Bank	 Doing	 Business	 indicator	 for	 ‘getting	electricity’	suggests	that	the	process	for	connecting	businesses	and	consumers	to	electricity	grids	is	very	slow	even	when	they	are	in	full	reach	of	grid	capacity	[119].	
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Broader governance challenges  Aside	 from	 the	 electricity	 grid	 access,	 affordability	and	reliability,	Mozambique	 faces	multiple	broader	governance	 challenges.	 Additional	 factors	 concern	the	country’s	political	economy	of	energy	and	wider	networks	in	which	the	country’s	energy	production	and	 consumption	 currently	 circulate.	 The	 policy	focus	 upon	 grid	 expansion	 has	 prioritised	 energy-generation	 ‘mega-projects’	 such	 as	 hydro-dams,	which	 have	 stimulated	 rapid	 GDP	 ,growth,	 but	created	 few	 jobs	 and	 few	 local	 linkages	 [141].	Megaprojects	are	significant	because,	in	both	higher	and	lower-income	economies,	they	provide	some	of	the	most	 enduring	 technical	 achievements	 created	within	society,	and	also	some	of	 the	most	costly	or	damaging	 mistakes	 [142].	 Altshuler	 and	 Luberoff	[143]	 argue	 that	 the	 neo-liberalisation	 of	infrastructure	 management	 has	 encouraged	governments	 to	 court	 major	 investors	 into	infrastructure	 development	 through	 processes	 of	privatisation	 of	 utilities,	 fiscal	 and	 regulatory	inducements;	 effectively	 politicising	 infrastructure	development	(and	simultaneously	privatising	public	works	–	shifting	away	from	direct	public	investment	towards	public-private	partnerships).	This	has	led	to	a	‘scaling-up’	of	infrastructure	development	leading	to	 a	 turn	 towards	 ‘grand	 scale’	 or	 ‘mega-project’	development.	Megaprojects	have	become	a	 form	of	symbolic	 urban	 revitalisation	 through	 economic	growth,	and	since	the	1990s	became	an	increasingly	common	 feature	 of	 economic	 development	 across	the	world.		In	 Mozambique,	 in	 broad	 terms,	 the	 logic	 of	neoliberal	 restructuring	 [122]	 has	 worked	 against	distributive	intentions:	foreign	companies	are	lured	to	large-scale,	export-oriented	projects,	rather	than	connecting	 the	poor	 to	 the	 grid,	while	 the	ongoing	financialisation	 of	 the	 energy	 sector	 makes	 it	complicated	for	national	energy	companies,	such	as	EDM,	 and	 local	 communities	 to	 exert	 influence.	These	problems	of	governance	are	then	exacerbated	by	the	high	levels	of	debt	accumulating	from	energy	megaproject	 development	 [144].	 Energy	megaprojects	 take	 decades	 to	 develop	 and	 build,	involve	 agreement	 and	 cooperation	 from	 multiple	public	 and	 private	 interests,	 and	 impact	 upon	millions	of	people	either	directly	or	indirectly	[145].	The	 broader	 social	 benefits	 from	 profit-sharing,	infrastructure	 provision	 and	 regional	 development	are	 commonly	 stressed	 by	 energy	 megaproject	proponents	 to	 ‘sell’	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 disruptive	megaproject	to	public	authorities.	It	is	the	potential	mass	 profits	 and	 the	 supposed	 benefits	 that	 these	bring	 in	 terms	 of	 employment	 and	 reducing	‘economic	 friction’	 [145]	 that	 “justifies”	 the	investment	 risk;	 megaprojects	 are	 therefore	appealing	to	policy-makers	for	political	and	symbolic	as	 well	 as	 practical	 reasons	 [146].	 However,	megaprojects	 such	 as	 major	 hydro-schemes	
commonly	 fail	 to	 achieve	 their	 stated	 objectives,	often	impose	heavy	cost	overruns,	project	delays	and	unintended	 consequences,	 and	 these	 can	 only	 be	absorbed	with	 great	pain	 and	difficulty,	 often	with	little	public	support	[145-147].	Moreover,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 connection	between	 EDM’s	 planning	 for	 grid	 expansion	 and	municipal	planning	around	which	areas	are,	in	turn,	growing	 and	 expanding.	 This	 has	 affected	 EDM’s	capacity	to	supply	electricity,	including	the	quality	of	electricity	supplied	to	both	old	and	new	customers	[148].	Officials	in	Frelimo	have	been,	until	recently,	committed	to	this	model	of	centralised	provision	of	services,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 security	 of	 energy	supply,	and	specifically	the	supply	of	electricity	[35].	Yet,	 the	 revelation	 in	 late	 2016	 of	 undisclosed	government	 loans	 and	 debt	 have	 caused	 economic	turmoil,	which	in	turn	has	affected	the	provision	of	social	services	[149-151].	There	has	been	resurgent	conflict	between	the	ruling	party	and	Renamo,	which	resulted	 in	 armed	 clashes	 in	 2013	 through	 2017.	This	political-economic	contestation	and	 insecurity	has	 affected	 the	 central	 government’s	 push	 to	expand	 energy	 provision	 and	 access	 to	 energy	 by	local	populations	affected	by	the	conflict.		Apart	 from	 these	 challenges,	 we	 still	 have	insufficient	 knowledge	 concerning	 the	 practices	 of	acquiring	and	using	energy	at	the	household	level	in	Mozambique.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 shifts	 in	 the	 political	economy	 of	 energy	 production	 have	 yet	 to	 fully	transform	 energy	 provision	 and	 everyday	 energy	practices	 in	 Mozambican	 households	 and	businesses.	For	 instance,	 fuel	supply	chains	remain	disconnected	 from	 the	 electricity	 generation	 and	distribution	systems	and	the	extraction	of	resources	such	as	coal	or	natural	gas	[85].	The	consumption	of	biomass	is	of	concern	to	authorities	because	of	rapid	deforestation,	 particularly	within	 the	 hinterland	 of	major	cities.	Though	there	is	a	paucity	of	qualitative	and	 quantitative	 evidence,	 Castán	Broto’s	 research	on	climate	compatible	planning	in	the	“Chamanculo	C”	 neighbourhood	 of	 Maputo	 [152]	 found	 that	residents	have	limited	expectations	of	municipal	or	national	 intervention	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 urban	infrastructure,	 including	 roads,	 sanitation,	 waste	collection	 and	 electricity.	 Maputo	 has	 the	 highest	electrification	rates	in	the	country,	but	many	of	the	outer	 bairros	 (neighbourhoods)	 are	 characterised	by	 the	ubiquitous	presence	of	charcoal	 for	cooking	and	heating	water.	More	recently,	Castán	Broto	[63]	has	observed	that	the	persistence	of	charcoal	use	in	Maputo’s	periphery	is	due	to	the	fact	that	it	enables	a	 measure	 of	 local	 control,	 or	 ‘sovereignty’	 over	energy	resources.		Baptista	 [29]	 offers	 an	 account	 of	 the	 shift	 to	 a	prepaid	electricity	meters	 in	Maputo,	 implemented	by	 EDM	 since	 2004	 to,	 among	 many	 reasons,	facilitate	 access	 among	 consumers,	 reduce	households’	 non-payment	 of	 electricity	 bills	 and	
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discourage	 illegal	 connections	 to	 the	 grid.	 Using	ethnographic	 research	 to	 examining	 everyday	practices	 in	 local	 communities,	Baptista	 found	 that	the	 prepaid	 system	 has	 given	 households	 greater	control	over	their	own	electricity	consumption	and	allows	 urban	 dwellers	 to	 more	 easily	 gauge	 and	understand	 what	 they	 consume,	 whilst	 reducing	unexpected	high,	cumulative	or	incorrect	billings	by	EDM,	 and	 thus	 avoid	 debt.	 Pre-payment	 has	extended	 access	 to	 residents	 facing	 energy	vulnerabilities,	despite	the	structural	inequalities	in	Maputo’s	 provision	 of	 services	 [29].	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 the	 electricity	 tariffs	 that	 are	 above	 most	household	 incomes	 have	 limited	 their	 continuous	use	 of	 electricity	 services,	 and	 have	 forced	households	to	adjust	their	electricity	consumption	to	the	 financial	 resources	 available	 by	 combining	charcoal	use	with	limited	use	of	electricity	[29,	63].	These	 conditions	 resonate	 with	 the	 concepts	 of	energy	 justice	 [153],	 scalar	 justice	 [154],	 and	 just	transitions	 [43],	 which	 have	 argued	 that	 we	 must	consider	the	multi-faceted	entanglements	of	electric	power	 and	 political	 power	 when	 discussing	generational	 and	 spatial	 justice	 within	 energy	production	and	consumption.		
Conclusions Mozambique	 is	 a	 major	 centre	 of	 hydropower	production	 and	 has	 extensive	 coal	 and	 natural	reserves,	 making	 it	 a	 potentially	 energy-resource	rich	 nation.	 Yet,	 while	 energy	 resources	 in	 the	country	are	abundant,	Mozambican	citizens	has	thus	far	 received	 little	direct	benefit,	especially	 those	of	lower-income	 status	 or	 in	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	areas.	 Demographic	 growth,	 new	 energy	consumption	 patterns,	 growing	 risks	 of	 extreme	weather	 and	 climate	 disruption	 events,	 and	institutional	 accountability	 deficits	 are	 all	exacerbating	what	is	experienced	on	the	ground	as	an	energy	crisis	[148].	Our	focus	on	urban	and	peri-urban	energy	represents	something	of	a	shift	away	from	the	priority	given	to	rural	electrification	within	the	objective	of	nationwide	access	to	electricity.	As	discussed	above,	increased	electricity	access	can	support	economic	development	and	the	eradication	of	 extreme	 poverty	 by	 supporting	 citizens	 in	securing	 sustainable,	 cleaner	 and	 safer	 energy	sources	 to	 power	 multiple	 productive	 activities,	mediated	communication,	education,	social	network	growth	and	entertainment.	However,	this	movement	is	 neither	 linear	 nor	 guaranteed,	 given	 wider	political-economic	frameworks	and	the	institutional	opportunities,	constraints	and	conflicts	that	we	have	outlined	 in	 this	paper.	We	must	better	understand	and	enlarge	our	analytical	frameworks	to	account	for	the	contextual	factors	that	have	shaped	the	growth	and	 stagnation	 of	 electricity	 network	 development	
and	 its	 effects	 on	 everyday	 practices	 and	 uses	 of	energy.		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 explore	 scenarios	 of	 future	development,	 and	how	 they	might	be	 achieved	 (or	resisted),	in	order	to	enact	practical	and	sustainable	grid	 access	 benefits	 to	 the	 poorest	 in	 the	 country.	What	 is	needed	 is	 further	decision-support	 related	research,	in	which	policy	responses	can	be	tailored	to	 future	 access	 goals,	 which	 account	 for	 broader	socioeconomic	 and	 governance	 challenges	 and	 the	ways	 in	 which	 social	 and	 political	 dynamics	 may	reshape	 new	 energy	 systems.	 Currently,	 there	 is	 a	gap	 between	 seeking	 to	 fulfil	 national	 SDGs	(including	 SDG#7	 on	 universal	 energy	 access	 by	2030)	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 poor	 households	 [125].	Fostering	 local	 ownership	 of	 community-based	systems,	 capacity-building	 approaches	 and	stakeholder	 empowerment	 are	 approaches	 with	untapped	 potential.	 The	 case	 of	 Mozambique	 also	points	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 examining	 social	 and	material	practices	of	acquiring	and	using	energy,	in	some	 cases	produced	by	new	 technologies	 such	 as	solar	 PV	 and	 gas-fired	 cooking,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	which	people	 interact	with	 them.	Furthermore,	we	must	 better	 understand	 the	 historical	 and	geographic	 scope	 of	 electricity	 sector	 reform	 in	regions	 beyond	 the	 capital,	 Maputo,	 and	 move	beyond	static	understandings	of	grid	extension.	
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